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Competence: A Dynamic Extension of the 
Existing Typology of Acquisition Motives 
 
 
Abstract  
What is the reason for acquisitions? Till now, strategies related to the daily operations of the firm like increased 
sale, reduced cost or managerial ambitions have been the prevalent motive. However, a new dynamic motive, the 
competence explanation is emerging. The purpose of this paper is to develop the existing typology on 
acquisition motives with a combined approach of competence, resource -based and network theories. The new 
motive of acquisitions is to acquire firms that posses core competencies. The main purpose of the acquisition is 
to transfer and utilize unique knowledge from the new subsidiary in the multinational corporation.  
 
 3
Competence: A Dynamic Extension of the 
Existing Typology of Acquisition Motives 
 
 
Introduction 
What is the reason for acquisitions? In the existing typology of motives of acquisitions, the main explanation is 
to gain the advantages of being large. When firms are growing they might get the opportunity to reach 
economics of scale, or gain the profit of being in a monopoly position. The growth into new business areas 
reduces the risk from fluctuating sales, and as a side effect, it is possible to reduce the capital cost too. 
Furthermore, if the price of a target firm is low, this will encourage the acquisition compared to other entry 
modes. Finally, if the manager wants to be in front of an empire, there is no need for an economic gain at all, 
acquisition will take place because of the fulfilment of individual ambitions. In spite of the last mentioned, the 
economic gain, or the synergy effect is normally the driver of the acquisition phenomenon. If there is no extra 
gain from putting two firms together, other solutions as the market or a green-field establishment would be 
preferable. Using the synergy effect as the motive of acquisition, however, shifts the approach of the advantage of 
being large to a more focused view of the resources  of the acquired firm. Now it is more important to acquire the 
right firm rather than just acquire firms. There must be unique elements in a certain target that the acquiring firm 
can use. The synergy effect gain rises from a more efficient use of the resources in the acquired firm. 
In this paper the main point is that a new motive extends the existing typology. The acquisition is here 
a search for competence. In the literature competence is defined as unique resources that are hard to imitate and 
therefore create a sustained competitive advantage. This paper illustrates how a firm can obtain new competence 
by a takeover of another firm. This gives a more dynamic approach, because an effective integration of the new 
subsidiary can take years compared to the other motives, where the effect of being large is reachable in the short 
run. Furthermore, another important distinction is that transfers of knowledge go from the acquired unit to 
other parts of the corporation compared to the classical motives, where transfers of knowledge only come from 
the headquarter.  
Another dimension of the competence approach is to pick out the right target and that depends on the 
acquiring firm’s ability to identify and measure the competence in other firms. Often the only way to obtain this 
knowledge is through network relations between the two firms. The necessary relations are a result of a long-
lasting trust -building between the two firms which comes from a mutual adjustment process rising from the 
daily business exchanges. The network theory is another and new way to understand the phenomenon of 
acquisitions. This approach also puts the acquisition process in a dynamic timetable, but here the view is 
backwards as well, because of the relations between the units before the takeo ver takes place. Finally, by using 
network theory, it is possible to bring in the relations between the firm and the environment, and the 
importance of the acquired firm’s network for the acquiring firm.  
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to make a short presentation of the existing typology, and in detail 
add the competence and the network approach, and in end see how this new approach affects the general view of 
the phenomenon.  
 
 4
Classical motives 
Table 1 shows the classical motives of acquisitions1. Here, motives are legion and reflect the fact, that there is not 
one theory covering all aspects. The reason for acquisitions appears from such different theories as the neo -
classical, capital market, institutional and the managerial behavioural approach 2. The end goal of the acquisitions 
is quite different, and firms have used acquisitions for more than 100 years to fulfil different strategies, Chandler 
(90). The competence approach is a new trend in business strategies, and this suggested extension is perhaps the 
next step in the evolutionary development of the multinational corporation. The typology therefore reflects 
different ways to grow and to develop competitive instruments in differ ent time-periods or in different 
industries. Much can be said about each theory, and the presentation here is short but with references to the 
existing literature. 
 
Table 1: Different motives of acquisitions 
Motive Result Theory 
Minimize Cost Large scale reduces different kinds of cost. Economics of scale 
Minimize Cost Hierarchical solutions reduces governance cost Transactions cost 
Market Shares Create or extend sales opportunity Growth 
Market Power Above-normal profit Monopoly 
Minimize Risk Minimizing fluctuations in revenues. Diversification 
Minimize Financial Cost Reduced capital cost and utilizing of tax shield. Debt/equity 
Speculative Acquisition’s price is lower than correct market price. Undervaluation 
Managerial Ambitions Maximizing managers wealth Empire-Building 
2+2 = 5 More efficient use of pooled complementary resources  Synergy 
 
 
Economics of Scale 
Merging two firms is an opportunity to produce in large scale and thereby diminish the per unit cost by a more 
efficient use of resources. The reduced cost motive is common in horizontal acquisitions where the takeover in 
the same line of business increases the production capacity directly. Physically the acquisition leads to the access of 
extra and sometimes unused production facilities, and the purpose of the investment is to reduce the overhead 
cost per unit, Dettmer (63). Vertical integration may result in the reduction of transport costs between steps in 
the production. General cost reductions could be the financial or the marketing cost, Hughes, Mueller and Singh 
(80). Here the approach relates to obtaining efficiency in administration, because the trouble dealing with large 
quantities often is no greater than dealing with small quantities, Florence (53). 
Acquisitions can be a tool to reduce over-capacity in an industrial sector, Goldberg (83), and often the 
gain rises from the rationalization especially in replicated working hours. Scale  economics also relates to a better 
                                                             
1 Most of the theories are concerned with mergers too, and in most of the literature the view is of mergers, or 
merger and acquisitions as well. This is a methodological problem, because there are major differences in the two 
approaches. However, the view of this paper will be the acquisition, because it is more suitable to the new 
approach. 
2 For other typologies see: Dettmer (63), Jervis (71), Steiner (75), Cooke (86), Trautwein (90), Walter and Barney 
(90), Weston, Chung and Hoag (90), Haspeslagh and Jemison (91), Sørensen (91), Chakrabarti, Hauschildt and 
Süverkrüp (94).  
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use of knowledge such as a full utilization of specialized and indivisible resources. It makes economical sense to 
use specialized individuals, technology, machines or information to their full capacity. Using these indivisible 
resources for other purposes are not profitable, because there is a possibility of using less expensive resources 
instead, Florence (53), Itami (87). Further, larger management teams are better to allocate resources and 
determine strategies for the whole corporation, Penrose (59). However, large organizations do not always face 
decreasing costs. Having too many employees leads to waste in work hours or output and can be so heavy that 
the demand saturates and each incremental unit of output requires higher selling expenses. Also, huge firms can 
run into complex managerial problems, because large production series may demand highly qualified, and 
expensive, management or production-specialists, Penrose (59). The question is how economics of scale relates 
especially to acquisitions compared to other ways of growth like the green -field establishment. The gain from 
rationalization is obvious, but the link to producing in large scale seems to be less obvious. However, firms use 
this strategy in hard competitive industries, where the fight for the market demands quick growth in market 
shares obtained by the lowest price. The American oil-industry in the late 19th century is a famous example here, 
Chandler (90)  
 
Transaction Cost  
The transaction cost approach  relates to the vertical integration, for example the acquisition of a supplier, who 
possesses a critical resource. Acquisitions reduce the cost related to governance structures, suppliers’ monopolistic 
gains and risk premiums and finally the cost related to the negotiation of contracts, Williamson (75), Hart (95). 
Second, even if suppliers are reliable, they may not be able to deliver the necessary flow of input, and this is 
especially important when talking about critical resources, Jervis (71). An example is firms with very high grow 
rates, where the production depends on semi-manufactured items, that may run into difficulties because of lags 
in the delivery from the supplying industries. On the other hand, after the takeover, the firm will still be facin g 
an agency problem but now of an intra-organizational character. The question is, whether these costs are less 
than the inter-organizational transaction cost. Anyway, if it is possible to measure the cost of the scenarios, the 
vertical integration could be reasonable.  
 
Growth 
The most common motive of acquisitions in practice is growth, because this is an easily measured goal, and 
therefore often chosen as the main strategy, Starbuck (65). Growth becomes a goal for its own sake and relates to 
the advantages of being large. Many firms truly believe that if they are large enough, they will posses a sustained 
competitive advantage by building an effective position in the market, an effective barrier against threats. Growth 
becomes a benchmark for progress, and growth is easy and quickly to obtain through acquisitions compared to 
green field establishments. Further, announced growth rates, such as 10 % per year, that might be difficult to 
reach by internal growth, stresses the acquisition process. To keep up with this goal, the amount of acquisitions 
must rise by acquiring larger and larger firms, or more of smaller firms, Penrose (59). By asking managers for the 
reasons for their firm’s acquisitions, the primary answer will be; growth. However, the economic literature rarely 
treats this approach. An explanation could be that growth as a motive is only explainable to the strategy leading 
to acquisition, not as a motive for the specific takeover. The growth motive often covers the fact that the firm 
wants access to new markets. By acquisitions the firm uses the acquired firm’s sales organization and its 
knowledge of the market. The goodwill relations are also important so the acquired firm can be a platform for 
further sales, Hallen and Wiedersheim -Paul (82). Furthermore, the full capitalization of an invention sometimes 
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needs quick access to main markets, and here it is preferable to acquire market channels by taking over the right 
firm., Marris and Mueller (80). In addition, acquisitions will secure growth without rising competition in an 
industry with no capacity for an extra demand, Gort (69), Wernerfelt (84). Following the customers is another 
motive. Especially when customers internationalize, the firm must follow this internationalization to meet their 
old customers on their foreign local market. This situation is important if customers happen to be other 
professional organizations, who demands a complete service, such as technological solutions adapted to local 
needs, Starbuck (65). Following the competitor is another argument. In a sector where rivals are making 
acquisitions, the firm must follow this strategy in an attempt to prevent rivals from building a dominant market 
position, Hay and Liu (98). Firms operating in saturated markets can only secure continual growth through the 
entrance of new markets. Often competitors occupy these markets too, and the only entry mode is through an 
acquisition. 
 
Monopoly 
In the end, the firm may attempt to be a market leader through acquisitions of their competitors. If the 
acquisition is large enough, the firms obtain a monopoly gain in terms of above-normal profit. Monopsony 
gain with lower prices on resources may be a result of a vertical integration. A firm with market power establishes 
barriers to entry for competitors and that extends the period of making profit, Hughes, Mueller and Singh (80), 
Trautwein (90). The monopoly position also improves the bargaining position of the firm, Gilbert and 
Newbery (92). On the other hand, there is a limit of growth, especially in form of the anti-trust legislation.  
 
Diversification 
Another motive for acquisition within the same industry is to reduce some of the uncertainty that derives from 
competition, Pfeffer and Salancik (78). In the theory of diversification the risk-adverse firm has an opportunity to 
minimize risk by expanding activities to different lines of business and thereby equalize the fluctuations in 
revenues. In the 1960s and the 1970s this motive of acquisition was very popular in practice and in theory, but 
now it has become less important. The reason for this is that most of the conglomerate acquisitions failed and 
ended up with losses for the acquiring firm3. Furthermore, theories show that for the shareholders it is much 
better to reach the market-portfolio through their investments than through the companies they own, Lewellen 
(71)4. Weston and Mansinghka (71) give several reasons for diversification. First to avoid sales and profit 
instability, next to elude unfavourable growth development and to avoid adverse competitive shifts. Further 
arguments are technological obsolescence and to decrease uncertainties associated with their industries. Finally, 
the motivation of a vertical acquisition of a supplier can be risk-reducing. An example is in the natural resource 
industries where demand and supply are unstable and integration can mitigate the cost associated with 
fluctuation in prices. 
Pitts (76) gives three reasons for diversifications. The most important is the situation where the failure 
of one business area threatens the whole corporation. Second, the diversified company has the opportunity to 
                                                             
3 The reason could be, as Chandler (90) suggests, the separation between CEO and the middle managers, who 
are responsible for the daily operations of the firm. Top managers, therefore, have a poor knowledge of 
technologies, markets and organizational norms in the different lines of business, although their task is to 
define strategies and allocate resources. 
4 The Sharpe-Litner portfolio theory proves this statement. Another financial model, the call-option pricing 
model is also against diversification, because it induces a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders, 
Amihud and Lee (81). 
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reallocate scarce resources to the most dynamic areas. Finally, there is a better opportunity to commercialize more 
broadly of technological innovations. 
To minimize the uncertainty in the environment is also important here, Pfeffer and Salancik (78), and 
the acquisition of a unit that knows the rules of the market is preferable. No industry is totally independent of 
the fluctuations in the economy, but some lines of business are not as cyclical as others. Further, different 
growth rates exist within the same industry, Salter and Weinhold (79). 
In the end what matters is what gives the highest NPV. When the firm reaches a satisfactory position 
within the area of specialization and the firm has the resources needed for expansion, they might find the 
opportunities for expanding into new areas more promising than further expansion in its existing areas, Penrose 
(59) 
 
Financial Synergy 
The main explanation for acquisitions in the capital market school is the gain that the company’s shareholders 
get in form of a higher value of their shares. The basis of most of the surveys controlling the effect of 
acquisitions, is the change in the stock-price and the creation of gains to the shareholders. However, this says 
more of the effect than the motive of acquisitions. Then, the capital market approach also contains gains from 
financial synergy. It arises from changes in the debt/equity ratio, resulting in less cost of capital or a better 
utilization of a tax shield. The cost of capital is a question of the size of the organization. By merging two firms 
it is possible to minimize the risk of bankruptcy by sharing capital. Lenders’ policies also influence the cost of 
capital and large companies sometimes have to pay less for borrowing capital. Furthermore, risk-adverse 
investors may prefer to make loans to large diversified firms rather than to small, specialized firms, Steiner (75). 
Raising the debt rate also creates financial synergy through the exploitation of the tax shield. This strategy is 
efficient as long as the value from reduced tax is higher than the cost of financial distress, Brealey and Myers (88). 
The new company with a lower bankruptcy risk could induce lenders to establish a higher limit of lending. This 
will exceed the sum of the original limit for the two individual firms and may result in a better exploitation of 
the tax shield, Lewellen (71). However, firms can raise their debt rate by obtaining loans through the market. 
Acquisitions will only outperform the market solution when there are some unused debt opportunities that the 
acquiring firm can utilize directly. Further, the acquiring firm does not have to convince lenders of the usefulness 
of the loan when raising debt through acquisition.  
 
Undervaluation 
Barney’s (86b) theory of ‘undervaluation’, where imperfections in the strategic factor markets5 create variations in 
‘the price of the firm’, is also an important approach. The imperfections regarding acquisitions emerge from 
different expectations to the net present value of the assets in the target firm. A firm that counts on a higher 
value of the utilization of assets than the market price dictate can obtain a gain from this gap. The opposite 
situation also exists. Here the buyer is too optimistic and therefore pays an overcharge in relation to the market 
price. This theory refers to Roll’s (86) hubris. Furthermore the winner of an ‘auction’ of the acquired firm, could 
be exposed to winner’s curse! 
Private information is another factor that relates to the undervaluation of a firm. If the acquiring 
company possesses private information and the market does not, the company has a possibility to buy the firm 
                                                             
5 A market where the resources necessary to implement a strategy are acquired, Barney (86b), p. 1231. 
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at a price lower than the real market -price6, Barney (88). At the end of the day it all depends on how firms 
measure assets, and theoretically they will choose the solution that will give them the highest net present value. 
In the real world other strategies might be more important and then the firm makes the decision of acquiring a 
specific target, then negotiations of the price starts, or raids start at the share markets. Then the only thing that 
can stop the takeover is the price, and it is up to the acquiring firm to decide what the right price would be 
according to their measurement that relies on private information. Finally, economic disturbances is another 
factor that creates discrepancies in valuation of the target firms because predictions of future income streams and 
risks are now more uncertain. An example of a common economic shock could be a rapid change in technology 
and knowledge, Gort (69). Another example is a depressed market for shares, where a speculative stress effect 
sets a general now and here market price that is lower than the real net present value. This may lead to acquisition 
because of the price. Here speculation relates to acquisition, but only heavy shifts in expectations will lead to the 
bying of blocks of shares, Hughes, Mueller and Singh (80)  
 
Empire-building 
Managers can have private or personal reasons for their behaviour and make investments, which from an 
economic point of view may seem irrational, but for the individual can be of high value. The other classical 
theories take their point of origin in maximizing the value of the shareholders, where this theory focuses on the 
managers’ own utility. The empire-building theory explains this situation of the management wanting growth 
for personal reasons and acquisitions match this situation. Most important is the wage explanation; the salary 
paid out to managers is a function of the size of the company, Mueller (69) . Motives like power and prestige are 
also essential; Ravenscraft and Scherer (87) and managers from large companies have an easier way to positions in 
committees and boards, Pfeffer and Salancik (78). Finally, managers engage in conglomerate mergers to decrease 
their employment risk, which is largely undiversificable. The risk consists of losing their job, professional 
reputation etc. The risk associated with managers’ income closely relates to the firm’s risk, Gort (69), Amihud 
and Lev (81)7. Another factor creating incentives to acquisitions is free cash flow, meaning cash flows more than 
required to fund all projects that have a positive net present value discounted at the relevant cost of capital. This 
cash flow belongs to the shareholders, but is used for investment instead and managers cause their firms to 
grow beyond the optimal size. A solution to this problem is issuing debt in exchange for stock, so contracts 
forces the managers to pay out future cash flows, Jensen (86). The managers’ time horizons relate to their tenure 
and are therefore shorter than the shareholders’ time horizons. Managers will not have an interest in cash flows 
that cover the period after the end of their term of office, Jensen and Meckling (76). Managers who are specialists 
in a certain business area will make investment in this particular area, so the success of the acquisition will rely on 
their individual competence. This will raise their earnings and defeat rivals who are better at running other kinds 
of business in the corporation, Högholm (94), Schleifer and Vishny (89). Finally we get to the situation where 
there is no reason at all except that the company gets the right offer at the right time, and then decides to take 
over the other company. Next, acquisitions could be routine so that the company always chooses this strategy 
instead of comparing the specific takeover with other alternatives. Finally, acquisitions could be the result of 
using ‘rules of thumbs’ or ‘having the right feeling’, reasons that rarely belong to the theoretical explanations. 
                                                             
6 Often acquisitions take place at a price much higher than the shares dictate. The only reason must be that the 
acquiring firm may estimate a gain from expectations relying on private information. Another example could be 
the acquisitions of shares in a hostile take over, where the bid is higher than the market price, to make the private 
investors sell.  
7 A new survey does not support this view, Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (98) 
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After all, this review of the empire-building theory shows that the more exotic explanations of acquisitions are 
very popular in the economic literature, and in contrast, theorists hardly ever mention the more simple and 
relevant motives such as growth and market -shares. 
 
Synergy 
None of the above mentioned reasons for acquisitions are preferable if there is no synergy effect in merging the 
two firms. If the value of the two firms is not higher than the value of the two individuals and independent 
firm, other ways to growth are preferable. By the synergy motive the importance of the resources in the acquired 
firm is in focus. By pooling complementary resources it is possible to reach a 2+2=5 effect, Teece (87), 
Richardson (72). This gives an intangible approach to the acquisition process. Introducing new ways of handling 
administrative procedures may result in a better use of existing resources, Penrose (59). In the classical synergy 
approach, the acquiring firm improves the performance in the acquired firm by transferring resources and 
knowledge to the new subsidiary. The transfer is therefore only going one way, from the headquarter to the new 
subsidiary. Most common is the transfer of managerial resources. The main approach here is the differential 
efficiency theory where the purpose is to improve the management in the acquired firm by bringing it up to the 
same level as in the acquiring firm, Weston, Chung and Hoag (90). Lack of managerial resources can be a 
bottleneck in a corporation causing unused operational resources. Opening the bottleneck by transferring new 
managers or introducing other management strategies creates synergy, Sanchez (99). The inefficient management 
theory relates closely to this approach. The basis assumption in this theory is the constantly poorly managing in 
some firms. The market price for shares will therefore decline relatively to the shares of other companies in the 
same line of business or to the market as a whole. The market for corporate control characterizes this mechanism 
securing acquisitions, Manne (65)8. 
Reaching synergy gives a more long-run perspective compared to the before-mentioned motives. This 
is due to the proble ms concerning integration of intangible resources, transfers of tacit knowledge, cultural 
disagreements etc.. The gains of acquisition due to market or scale are easier to reach in the short run. For 
example the connections to new customers already exist. Second, the possibility of producing larger quantities 
starts immediately. Further, the motives such as reaching financial synergy, personal ambitions, or the monetary 
gain from an undervalued target are again easy to reach immediately. The use of synergy as an explanation 
therefore introduces the dynamic approach. Further, the focus shifts to how to use resources in a better way. 
Therefore the synergy approach connects to the extension of the typology of acquisitions’ motives because of its 
dynamically resource-based elements.  
 
Competence: The Extension of the Classical Approach 
The major distinction using the competence approach in describing the phenomenon of acquisitions compared 
to the classical approach is the localization and the transfers of resources. The acquired firm and its resources are 
the points of interest rather than the resources in the acquiring firm. The purpose of the acquisition is the 
takeover of unique resources, and transferring them back to the headquarter or to other subsidiaries in the 
corporation. This can be in terms of transfers of best practices, diffusion of knowledge or the use of unique 
                                                             
8 Fama (80) does not believe in the market for corporate control. In companies with diffuse ownership managers 
are better disciplined through managerial labour markets, both internal and external, where governance structures 
stimulate the ongoing efficiency, and the market of outside takeovers should be the last resort, because it is 
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resources in a complementary pooling with other resources elsewhere in the corporation. The question is when a 
firm has a status as a compet ence-based unit, and when an acquiring firm can make a profitable use of new 
resources. 
For several years there has been a theoretical discussion of giving a precise definition of what 
‘competence’ is. The competence-theories take a macro -oriented view whereas analysis takes its basis from 
picking out certain firms in a certain industry and concluding that these firms are indeed superior because they 
posses certain capabilities that give them a sustained competitive advantage. To obtain this, following Prahalad and 
Hamel (90), Hamel (94), Eriksen and Foss (97), the competence must be unique and hard to imitate. Next, the 
competence is only located in one firm, or else the use of it must be superior. Finally, the competence must make 
a disproportionate contri bution to customer-perceived value, and provide an entrée to new markets.  
The resource-based theory, as the name indicates, takes its basis in the resources and the use of them. 
This tradition starts with Penrose’s (59) description of the resources and the administrative co -ordination of 
these and how they effect the growth of the firm. Important here was the idea of competitive advantage rising 
from this perspective, further how growth (such as acquisitions) links to resources. So creation of competence 
comes from possession of unique resources and managerial and organizational ways to use them efficiently. 
Firms in the same industry compete with fundamental different bundles of resources and use different strategies 
in spite of coherence with product and market. This creates a variation of firms, where some of them possess 
competence that gives them a competitive advantage, Rumelt (84). This emphasizes the point that if a firm 
wants to acquire competence only specific firms fulfil this goal, compared to acquisition of production facility, 
market-shares etc.. 
The essential problem in the competence approach is to identify the competence in a specific firm. 
Capabilities are not the specific product, like Coca-Cola, but underlying structures that lead to competitive 
positions, in this example image and an effective distribution system. Therefore competence can be a part of 
every unit of an organization. Sanchez and Heene (96), see firms as hierarchical systems, where competence exists 
at different levels, such as an operational, tangible and intangible asset’s level and of the governance managerial 
levels. Capabilities differ in the levels but have to be complementary to produce a competitive offer for the 
customers.  
The basis of the competence is often a composition of resources that is the result of a historic and 
evolutionary accumulation of knowledge, experience and, skills and strategic assets, Nelson and Winter (82), 
Dierickx and Cool (89), which again is a consequence of a row of strategic choices and fulfilment of goals, Rumelt 
(84). Firms are therefore specific social inventions, reflecting the uniqueness, the skills and experience and 
behaviour of those who work there. Factors that lead to a rare culture that forms both the present and the future 
develo pment of competencies, Barney (86a). Wernerfelt (84) combines unique resources and acquisition by 
explaining that mergers and acquisitions give access to obtaining competence from the ‘outside’ by buying assets 
that otherwise are non-marketable. Wernerfelt (84) pp. 175 defines four factors when estimating the value of a 
specific target, according to the acquiring investment strategies, and which motives and strategic goals that the 
firm must fulfill. 
a) What resources has a given target, 
b) which of those can the firm effectively take advantage of, 
c) what the cost of doing so will be and  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
expensive. Marris and Mueller (80) support this argument by saying that the incentive or at least the threat of a 
takeover is a permanent and effective monitor on management.  
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d) what the firm could pay for them. 
Acquiring a firm is more than buying a set of physical assets as most of the value relates to resources 
embedded in the company. Every firm has resources, what matters here is the quality of them. Next, the target 
may posses unique resources, but this is not to say that the acquiring firm can make use of it. The competence 
might not fit in the acquiring firm’s strategy or the needed transfers of resources might be too difficult. What the 
acquiring firm really needs is the private information of the resources as Barney (88) describes it. The question is 
how the acquiring firm obtains this information which leads to the approach described in the next chapter.  
 
Network: The extension of the classical approach 
A newer approach in characterizing the firm and its strategies is the network theory, which describes the 
corporation by its intra-organizational and environmental relationships. This approach includes the acquisition 
phenomenon because the reason for the takeover is to secure a certain position in a specific network. Acquiring a 
foreign firm does not only include its buildings, employees, machines, human capital and capabilities. It also 
includes connections to counterparts, customers, suppliers, research laboratories, universities and furthermore its 
competitors, alliance partners, joint ventures etc.. A motive of acquisitions could be a firm’s favourable 
knowledge connections in the local environment plus the ability to adopt and utilize the know-how into a 
product with a global sales design. The question is; what is a network precisely? One answer given is that a 
network is a system of relationships between firms (actors) that are dependent on each other and whose co-
ordination of activities is of great importance. This co -ordination is not the result of central planing or an 
organizational hierarchy, nor through the price -mechanism but through interaction between firms in a network, 
where the price is just one of several influencing factors, Johanson and Mattsson (88), Forsgren et al. (95). A firm 
can participate in different nets, such as a special product net, a national net, a research net, an intra-organisational 
net etc.. All these nets co-ordinate into one major overlapping network and changes in one net may have an 
influence in other nets by changes in relations between the actors, Mattsson (98). In the network theory a firm’s 
strength characterizes its position in the market, a position that changes over time because relations between firms 
continually establish, maintain, develop or break. The role the firm has for other firms, its importance to other 
firms, and the strength of the relationship explains the strength of the position, Johanson and Mattsson (88). 
Relations to other firms secure access to important and critical external and mostly heterogeneous resources.  
The relationship between firms is very important in the network theory especially in the explanation of 
acquisitions. Firms in a market are independent units that control resources, but no firms can survive without 
interaction with other firms. Interaction is essential both because of access to physical resources and to some 
extent also the access to intangible resources such as knowledge. A long-lasting relationship between two 
partners creates trust and makes it possible to participate in profitable exchanges. In the network approach, 
competitors are not always the enemy, and counterparts are rarely opportunistic. The result of a long-lasting and 
well-acting relationship often leads to an acquisition or a merger. Examples of this are not necessarily the case of 
exchanging goods and services, but also include exchanges of complex relations in form of alliances, joint 
ventures etc., Loasby (98). Here the relationship is not a main motive, but the connection results in trust, and 
the necessary knowledge about the target’s capabilities, strategies, and network positions. Often firms wanting to 
make an acquisition, whatever the reason is, start (and end) their investigation of the market by their 
counterparts. The relations between the firm embed the knowledge needed for making the acquisition and the 
following successful integration. From the sellers point  of view the relations are also essential. One example 
could be when owners, and especially one-man owned firms, contact its former and trustworthy counterparts, 
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where the seller is aware of the firm’s strategy thereby securing a continued business ethics in the former owner’s 
spirit9. Trust is therefore another essential term in the network terminology. Complex relations take time to 
establish, for example, to know which persons have knowledge or influence in the network companies. Levels of 
confidence have to be built up, graduated from formal to personal relationships, and social exchanges between 
two firms are often essential in trust-building. This inter-firm relationship is a mutual orientation of two firms 
toward each other, and the interaction causes mutual knowledge and trust in each other. Repeated business 
exchanges create knowledge of each other’s capabilities and by close co -ordination reduce exchange cost, 
Anderson, Johanson and Vahlne (97). Finally, a network is also an adoption process, where the parties adjust to 
each other by modifying product and processes, attitudes, knowledge and strategies. The result of an adoption 
process is a common language, contracting rules and standardization. Cost of building up these relationships, 
constrains the possibility to exchange and therefore the network becomes interdependent and stable structures, 
Johanson and Mattsson (88), Forsgren (89), Forsgren et al. (95). That it will often take years of costly activities 
before the actors have proved that they are trustworthy is important to consider. Due to acquisitions trust-
building is, therefore, a two-edged sword because long-lasting relationship is often the basis for a certain 
acquisition, but at the same time it can impede the entrance of a newcomer. By a takeover the firm is obtaining 
access to the acquired firm’s network, but are they able to make any changes without interrupting these network 
connections? Business relations are only stable to the degree where both actors consider the exchanges worthy. 
Furthermore, each business relation is unique and relies on tacit agreement, and the question is whether a third 
part can join this connection, Anderson, Johanson and Vahlne (97). 
The network theory gives at least three new motives for acquisitions. In the ‘traditional’ explanations 
like synergy, market power etc., the motives relate to the inside of the acquired or in the acquiring firm. The 
network theory widens the perspective by including the relationship to the environment. The first motive for 
acquisition in the network theory is to establish or develop a certain position at a new market. Second, long-
lasting familiar or personal relationship motivates an acquisition. Finally, which is the main point, the acquisition 
of a ‘centre of competence’, or a firm that can turn into such a centre. The latter gives a more broad view of the 
competence approach, because of the adding of elements from the network theories.  
 
The network and the competence approach as a combined explanation 
The acquisition of ‘competence’ is a new way to follow this dynamic strategy where the strategic role of the 
coming subsidiary is of the highest importance. The basic factor of the takeover is the previous relations of the 
two firms. This is due to the nature of competence-resources that can be very hard to recognize. The main 
motive for the acquiring firm is still to secure a future competitive position at a certain market (network). 
Therefore they take over a target which posses the needed unique and competitive resources (and network-
connections). To make sure that the price is right and that it is possible to transfer and exploit the underlying 
capabilities the firm often chooses well-known targets. 
                                                             
9 The situation where the wish for acquisitions comes from the seller is an overlooked explanation of the 
acquisition phenomenon. There are several incentives for selling a firm. Reasons could be a poor economy, a 
need of further capital or a need for generational change. In the latter the owner himself sometimes makes 
contact with the company, and often he has a network relation to the new owner, Mueller (69). Another 
situation is when managers are about to be ousted, they may prefer a merger with another company if they can 
ensure better positions for themselves in the newly formed company, Mueller (69). In practice, the incentive of 
the acquisition often comes from the seller, Ravenscraft and Scherer (87), or from a third part , such as banks or 
other private investment organizations, Lindvall (91).  
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The combined approach, therefore, gives a very long time-perspective, going from the first exchanges 
between the two firms up to the time of the decision of the takeover, where mutual trust-building is taking 
place. After the takeover there is another long time-period where integration takes place. 
 
Table 2: The new motives of acquisitions 
Motive Result Theory 
Competitive advantage Core-competencies secure a sustained competitive advantage Competence  
Resources  A unique pool of resources, and efficient management of these.  Resource-based 
Position Taking another position in a different network depending on trust and relations. Network 
Center of competence Previous relations create the needed private information to pickout a target with 
competence. It is possible to transfer resources and make use of them in a 
profitable way 
Combined 
Approach. 
 
Conclusion 
Why does firm A wants to buy firm B? There are different replies to this question. The answers are legion and 
include explanation such as reaching synergy effects by pooling resources or raising efficiency by replacing the 
management. Reduced cost is attainable through economics of scale and vertical integration can lead to a change 
in cost related to governance structures. The most natural explanation is the growth motive, where the strategic 
goal is the entrance at new market. Intensifying this growth results in monopoly position. Entering new lines of 
business through diversification neutralize the effect of fluctuations in earnings. Acquisitions motivated by 
financial motives reduce the capital cost and make an opportunity for a better utilization of different tax 
structures. Another financial approach relates to the price of the undervalued target because of imperfections in 
the market of information. Finally, the acquisition may cover an economic irrational point of view, because 
managers try to maximize own wealth by an empire-building strategy. Taking a basis in the network theory, the 
discussion in this paper tries to develop the existing taxonomy by introducing the dynamic approach of the 
relations to the environment as a factor in the acquisition phenomenon. The wish to establish or develop 
positions in a network can lead to a takeover. Long-lasting relationships between actors are an additional 
incentive to the phenomenon. In a sear ch of competence acquisitions can take place, because the acquired firm 
possesses attractive competencies or network relations that gives an opportunity for knowledge diffusion back to 
the headquarter or other affiliates. The aim is to acquire core competencies that can secure sustained competitive 
advantages. Core competencies arise from a unique pool of resources combined with an efficient administrative, 
managerial and organizational structure.  
It is possible to extend the existing typology of classical acquisition’s motives with the competence 
approach, where the motive is to secure a sustained competitive position, the resource-based view, where unique 
resources and ways to handle them are the point of focus, and finally the network approach, where the firm 
wants to take new positions in the environment.  
In a combination of the three approaches, previous relations between actors are important as a 
measurement of competencies.  
The new approach is different from the classical approach because the focus is on the resources in the 
acquired firm. Further, in transfers of resources, knowledge goes from the acquired firm to the acquiring firm. 
Third, the approach includes the importance of the environment. Finally, The combination of the network and 
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the competence theory gives a dynamic approach where both the past and the future are important factors in the 
acquisition process. 
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